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Ius Matrimoniale Concordatarium 
A comparative approach 
 
Abstract. The comparative examination of the matrimonial parts of the treaties bond 
between the Holy See and the states (concordatarian law) shows that during the 20th century, 
the Catholic Church has contracted in this matter such a way that it was able to conclude 
stronger treaties with the local secular sovereigns. The actuality of the examination of the 
Catholic Church’s international treaties becomes obvious during the examination only. In the 
treaties of the last decade, a significant change can be followed in the Parties’ legal 
relationships, which is an important step in the course of the gradual formation from the first 
half of the 20th century. As a result of the examination of the legal structure of treaties of 
these ten years, the tendencies of the former decades can better be understood as well. 
Recently such a treaty-material is available for us, on which it is possible and worth carrying 
out an examination.  
 This essay contains the detailed examination of all matrimonial parts of the Catholic 
Church’s international treaties with a consideration of all legally relevant bearings to be 
found in them.1 In the Appendix, one can find the whole text to examine in English.2 This 
essay, as it issues from its genre, is to be read with the Appendix together.  
 
Keywords: concordatarian intention, treating force, canonical legal order, local secular legal 
order, canonical bond of matriomony, legal link, secular legal effects 
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 1 It means only such parts of treaties are left out which are not effective to the legal 
main figures and as exceptions are not significant either. 
 2 Usage of the Appendix: 
 1. Numbering of chapters in the Appendix (after a “A”) follows that in the main text. 
 2. a) The original text of the treaty can be found in the Appendix if one of its original 
languages is English. In this case the texts stays without quotation marks. 
  b) If neither of the treaty’s original language is English, and most of them are such, 
the Appendix shows the possibly literally translated text, containing all legally accurate 
and relevant terms (instead of a translation of literature). The translation uses the legally 
relevant terms of the same English equivalent to have the most reliable text as a basis of 
the examination. In this case the texts is put in quotation marks.  
 3. The sign of source, the translation of which can be read next to it, stays in the first 
place on the left side, the rest of them lists the legally equivalent norms.  
 4. The structure of signing the sources: Country year/article E.g.: Italy 29/34 = the 34th 
article of the agreement of Italy of 1929. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
1.1. Preliminary theoretical and methodological remarks 
 
It is ascertainable about the legal nature of the material to be examined (Catholic 
Church’s international treaties) that they are sources of law of international law. 
We have to set out from this by elaborating the methodology of examination. 
On the one hand, the consensus of the international practice and literature of 
international law claims that the agreements are part of the sources of law and 
even the formal consideration is the reason for it. On the other hand, most of 
the treaties declare themselves as law meaning the Parties consider them as law. 
Further on, from the point of view of the content they establish rights and 
duties between the Parties. The Catholic Church contracts exclusively legally 
good considerable agreements with nations and political communities.3  
 As for these treaties, they contain material of law to be examined by a 
methodology of law. A comparative methodology with a positivistic attitude 
is used here starting strictly out of the text of treaties. This still will not lead 
to an exaggerated cardboard and poor result, because the text of treaties are 
amazingly rich in phenomena, from which connections and tendencies can be 
disclosed.  
 Catholic church’s legal order4 (the canon law) is current around the world5 
while secular sovereigns’ law is local. The collisional law relating to a certain 
part of the Catholic Church, which coincides with a certain secular sovereign’s 
territory is the concordatarian law, which is obviously local country by country 
as well. However, it is possible to make a comparison among concordatarian 
legal regimes, and this comparative examination has an international public 
nature as well. The scope of the present essay is restricted to the matrimonial 
law parts of concordats exclusively.  
  
 3 The term is taken over from the 3. canon of the Codex Iuris Canonici (abbr.: CIC 3.) 
 4 Basic sources (fons cognoscendi): 1. current from 1983: Codex Iuris Canonici 
auctoritate Ioannis Pauli PP. II promulgatus. Fontium, annotatione et indice analitico-
alphabetico auctus, Citta del Vaticano 1989. (abbr.: CIC), 2. it was current from 1917 to 
1983: Codex iuris canonici Pii X Pontificis Maximi iussu digestus, Benedicti Papae XV 
auctoritate promulgatus, fontium, annotatione et indice analitico-alphabetico ab E.mo Petro 
Card. Gasparri auctus, Typ. Pol. Vat 1974. (abbr.: CIC’17). 
 5 Canon law jurists call it as universal law as well. This universality is discernible from 
the context of the 3. canon of the current Codex too, which is dealing with international 
treaties: “Codicis canones initas ab Apostolica Sede cum nationibus aliisque societatibus 
politicis conventiones non abrogant neque iis derogant; eadem idrico perinde ac in praesens 
vigere pergent, contrariis huius Codicis praescriptis minime obstantibus.” (CIC 3.) 
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 It is worth going over the legal examination and explaining the agreements 
in their broader context. The results of comparative law examination can call the 
attention to the different ways of approach in different countries.6 Besides the 
juridical methodology, the methods of social history and of diplomacy should 
be used. The premise of this stage is that the text put down in treaties is the 
projection of the actual certain age and moment, from which as an indicator, 
the intentions and their backgrounds can be deduced brought into existence by 
the treaty (the principle of the contextuality of the comparative law).7 Putting 
findings together in a broader view, it will outline the Catholic Church’s 
concordatarian politics in the field of the matrimonial law.  
 
1.2. Competence of legal orders and their collision 
 
If a matrimonial bond comes into being between two parties, its different legal 
effects (sacred and profane) are set up in different fields of the human life. The 
single legal orders are ruling that field of human life, which is in their competence 
by own right. The Church reserves exclusive jurisdiction in the field of sacred 
entities, and the secular state (on a basis of its own principles) does not lay 
claim to it. One can see that the two legal orders (both on a basis of their own 
principles), independently of one another and all by oneselves, subsist and 
succeed. A connection between them is just a possibility and the expressed 
intentions of the Parties bring it into being.  
 In the matrimonial law however there is a collision, but just concerning the 
fact of matrimony. In regard to the matrimony of the Catholics, who are obliged 
to the canonical form, the canon law is competent.8 Since the establishment of 
secular matrimonial laws at the end of the 19th century, the secular legal orders 
declared themselves competent in it as well. The canon law however does not 
deal with its consequences9 regarding to property, inheritance, (in case of family 
taxation) taxation,10 etc., but the secular legal orders distinguish them.  
  
 6 Wienczyslaw, W. J.: Comparative law: its methodology and development in the 
United States. Comparative Law Review (1991), 2, 7. 
 7 Konijnenbelt, W.: Discours de la methode en droit public comparé. In: Comparability 
and Evaluation in Honour of D. Kokkini-Iatridou, Dordrecht, 1994. 125–126. 
 8 Leo XIII., Litt. Enc. Arcanum, 1880. II. 10, in: Acta Sanctae Sedis 12 (1879–1880), 
393 contains that the church in matrimonial cases has juridical power of its own right, and 
not as a result of the local state’s concession.  
 9 “Item non ipsa ignorat neque diffitetur sacramentum matrimonii, cum ad conservatio-
nem quoque et incrementum societatis humanae dirigatur, cognationem et necessitudinem 
habere cum rebus ipsis humanis, quae matrimonium quidem consequuntur, sed in genere 
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 This has multilayer consequences:  
 1. Since the secular legal orders are changing in that direction, that the same 
legal effects are attached to the mere cohabitation to the matrimony, Christians 
are less and less interested in the celebration of matrimony according to the 
secular law. Therefore, in countries where the secular legal order does not 
oblige the secular celebration before the ecclesiastical one, the Christians less 
and less get married by secular celebration. As a consequence they can not 
expect without concordatartian law to be regarded by the secular forum as 
living in matrimony.11   
 2. Other secular legal orders oblige the parties to declare their matrimonial 
consensus in face of the secular registrar before the ecclesiastical matrimony. As 
several secular laws at the end of 19th century went in this direction, a theoretical 
problem arose in the canon law. The canon law thinks from a point of view of 
the natural law and according to the natural law the first declaration of matri-
monial consensus is valid. This was the cause that led to the formation of the 
canonical principle according to which the secular celebration on ecclesiastical 
forum is not an invalid legal act but a non-existing legal act.12 This was 
necessary for re-establishing the normal (initial) position (the two legal orders 
succeed independently and parallelly with each other) after duplicating the 
matrimonial legal regime from the secular Party’s part.  
 The canonical legal order (like secular ones) defines its competence on a 
basis of the legal status of legal subjects (persons). Those persons’ cases (of 
matrimony bond in canonical form), belong to the canonical matrimonial law’s 
competence, where at least one of the parties is catholic. However, the concor-
datarian law never thinks on a basis of the persons’ legal status, but always on 
the basis of the form of of a bond coming into existence (we should speak 
about the canonical status of the bond). A collision law starting out of the 
persons’ legal status would be impracticably complicated.  
 The concordatarian matrimonial law (after the positive law came into being 
by concluding the agreement) deals with the fact of the matrimony and with 
taking on the obligation of the secular Party, it attributes legal effects into its 
own legal order. On the other hand the concordatarian law does not deal with 
                                                      
civili versantur, de quibus rebus iure decernunt et cognoscunt qui rei publicae praesunt.” 
Leo XIII., Litt. Enc. Arcanum, 1880. II. 10. in: Acta Sanctae Sedis, (1879–1880), 399. 
 10 If, for instance, an intervening decision in an ecclesiastical suit is needed regarding 
such a matter, the ecclesiastical court will adopt (receptio iuris) the local secular law, 
current in its territory of competence (cf. CIC 22., 110., etc.). 
 11 Perhaps it can prohibit a married woman using the name of the husband in personal 
papers.  
 12 This means that its nonentity does not need verification.  
 IUS MATRIMONIALE CONCORDATARIUM 31 
  
the established legal effects in the canonical and secular legal orders, because 
after their rise they independently succeed in the single legal orders and do not 
have any interference. Therefore connection just comes into existence between 
two legal orders where the concordatarian law positively makes it.  
 Summing it up: 
 1. The concordatarian intention is directed towards the partial or the whole 
withdrawal of the pressure of the double contract from the part of the secular 
Party, thus the Christians do not have to declare their matrimonial consensus 
twice in favour of legal effects in the secular legal order as well. 
 2. Therefore, the concordatarian law always concentrates on one thing: to 
bring into existence the legal link between  
a) – the canonically formed contraction (declaration of matrimonial 
consensus) or 
  – the canonical bond (vinculum matrimoniale)13  
 b) and its secular consequences (secular legal effects).  
 
1.3. Essential similarity of fundamental rules 
 
The canonical main figure has shaped up from the verbal contract inherited 
from the Roman law since the Constantinian age.14 There is a regulation in the 
authentic collection called Liber Extra (promulgated in 1234.) of Gregory the 
IX.,15 but the definitive ruling has been accomplished only by the famous 
decree called Tametsi of the General Council of Trident in the 16th century.16 
Thereto, the concordatarian law is possible, because the main figure of contraction 
a matrimony (the celebration) in secular legal orders did not diverged from that 
of the main figure of the canon law during the evolution of the single national 
matrimonial laws. Without this, it would surely be impossible or at least rather 
difficult for the Parties to condescend.  
 During the examination, the ecclesiastical Party is unchanging. It is worth 
summarizing the basic principles of this. There are two fundamental concepts: 
  
 13 The concept of the matrimonial bond (vinculum matrimoniale) has an important role 
in the canonical legal figure of the marriage. This promotes that the valid marriage would 
be considered in the legal practice as an objective legal fact, which is the consequence of 
the valid contraction.  
 14 Gaudemet, J.: Droit romain et principes canoniques en matière de mariage an Bas-
Empire, in Studi Albertario II., Milano, 1950, 173–196. 
 15 X. 4. 2.  
 16 Concilium Eocumenicum Tridentinum, Canones super reformatione circa matrimonium, 
Tametsi, Sessio XXIV, Caput I, 1563. XI. 11, in: Alberigo, G.–Jouannau, P.–Leonardi, C.–
Prodi, P.: Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta, Freiburg, 1962, 731. 
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the form of contracting matrimony (forma celebrationis martrimonii) and the 
matrimonial consent (consensus matrimonialis). 
1. a) The canonical form consists of three elements: 
  – two parties 
– to declare his/her matrimonial consensus in the presence of the 
church’s authorised representative, 
  – two witnesses.17 
 b) Here should stay the Hungarian Family Law18 as an example which rules 
the formal properties of binding as: 
  – parties to be married are jointly present, 
  – the registrar, to declare personally that they intermarry with each other, 
  – in the presence of two witnesses, 
  + the registrar publicly registers it.19 
2. The matrimonial consent (inherited from the Roman law) is considered by 
the canon law and secular legal orders as well as a verbal contraction, 
which is its establishing cause.  
 a) Its canonical definition consist of three elements: 
  – legally able parties, 
  – legally declared, 
  – conscious act.20  
 b) In the Hungarian Family Law the definition of matrimonial consent does 
not exist. 
 
1.4. Structure of matrimonial parts of the agreements 
 
All matrimonial chapters consist of two main parts: 
 1. They attribute legal effects to the fact of the declaration of matrimonial 
consensus or to the canonical bond.21 With this, the connection comes into 
existence between the two legal orders according to the concordatarian intention. 
 2. Further norms are ruling the  
  a) conditions (if the secular law considers the elements of the funda-
mental rules  otherwise as the canon law), 
  b) circumstances, 
  c) cessation of the legal effects. 
  
 17 CIC 1108. 
 18 1952. year IV. law 2 §. 
 19 The canon law doesn’t rank the registration in the register of births among the formal 
properties but it is regulated separately (CIC 1121. 1. §, 3. §, 1122. 1. §, 1123.). 
 20 CIC 1057. 
 21 See the explanation in the Examination.  
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2.  Examination  
 
2.1. Attribution of the legal effect 
 
2.1.1. The establishing norm of the legal effect  
 
There are 17 agreements all dealing with matrimonial law, as well as protocols, 
which are independent, or the appendixes of the mentioned agreements. All 
agreements start with a norm to establish the legal effects. 
 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
 1. The attributive verb: 
 a) Since the Italian Concordat from 1929 which was the first one dealing 
with the matter of marriage up to that bond with Malta in 1993, the verb 
“recognises” (riconosce) was used by turns. This idiom suggests as if the 
canonical and the national legal order were not of equal rank, and the secular 
Party would “grant” the validity to the canonical matrimonial bond. This passage 
is a typical one, where the legal principle of states formed during the wave of 
separation, and the claim of the state legal order to exclusiveness can be well 
manifested. From the state Parties thinking in this manner, the ecclesiastical 
Party could receive the civil effects of the bond as a concession.  
 b) The “brings about”, “produces”, “will have”, “has the same force”, terms 
legally mean the same. The bond established in the canonical legal order by a 
valid contraction, in the same time, produces the equivalent legal effects in the 
secular legal order as well.  
 The concept of the matrimonial bond22 (vinculum matrimoniale) has an 
important role in the canonical legal figure of the marriage. This promotes that 
the valid marriage would be considered in the legal practice as an objective 
legal fact, which is the consequence of the valid contraction.  
 2. The consideration of the canonical marriage: 
 a) To this concept, there are six different idioms in the agreements. The idiom 
“sacrament of marriage” to be found in the Italian agreement of 1929 could seem 
of a bit of pietism in an international agreement, but looking at the even more 
frequently appearing theological matters, it is aftermath less surprising. The 
Austrian agreement of 1933 presses legal approach by the idiom “contracted 
marriage”, and it can also be found later in the Italian agreement of 1984.  
  
 22 CIC 1134. 
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 b) The idiom “marriages celebrated in accordance with the norms of canon 
law”23 was used in the Spanish-Portugal cultural circle and in the southern 
European Malta’s agreement as well. The secular Party’s affection for the rite as 
an attitude of codification is possible, but I consider the cause of this formula is 
the cultural circle’s social-psychological character and legal approach in which 
the person to person linkages are very important (in contrast with the Nordic 
institutionalism).  
 c) Legally, the “catholic marriage” and the “canonical marriage” forms are 
the most correct ones used by the Polish agreement of 1993, while in the same 
time the not really pleasant idiom of ‘contract’ is avoided in this topic.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 ad 1. Looking at the dates, it is clear that the idiom “recognises” has been 
changed to “produces” after 1993. By this, the first definitive norm is transformed 
in its mechanism: the legal effect in the secular legal order automatically estab-
lishes because of the concordatarian law itself, although the further norms take 
ad validitatem conditions as well. By this, the canonical legal order in this 
respect is tacitly present as an equal legal order. This is part of that process, in 
which after the weakness of the concordatarian law at the turn of the century the 
negotiative force of the ecclesiastical Party is increasingly growing, and as it 
seems, it is able to assert its claims permanently. Shortly, it concludes an 
agreement only with a Party, which is ready to accept this mechanism.  
 ad 2. The change of the consideration of the canonical marriage is related 
to the preceeding tendency: 
 The idiom “celebration” expresses the event, (declaration of the matrimonial 
consensus), while all the other idioms enumerated in paragraphs a) and c) are 
expressing the matrimonial bond as a legal fact set up in the canonical legal 
order which was established as a consequence of that event. From the point of 
view of the legal practice, as a first approach, it seems to be the same that a 
fact happened in the order of the reality or a fact of canon law which has been 
established as a consequence of the previous, can be taken as a nearer cause 
producing the secular effect, since the canon law ensures the unequivocal cor-
respondence between the declaration of the consensus and the bond. Further 
on, we can see that this is not such a simple thing.  
 The explanation based exclusively on the text: 
 It seems that the establishing from the event leads to ambiguity. This allows, 
that the declaration of the matrimonial consensus interprets the secular law on 
a basis of its matrimonial law, and it judges it valid or invalid. Moreover it also 
  
 23 Matrimoni celebrati in conformita con le leggi canoniche. 
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means that only so much had been realized from the concordatarian intention 
that there are no two declarations of consensus, but only one, however the 
legal orders are interpreting that one according to its rules. Now, this does not 
mean that canonical bond becomes more effective in the secular sphere, but it 
merely indicates the elimination of the state celebration.  
 The intention of avoiding this ambiguity could lead to the later practice. 
These later agreements, using the automatically established form, are always 
establishing the secular effects from the canonical bond (except the Estonian 
agreement of 1998 only) while earlier, in those agreements where the “recog-
nises” formula was used this had happened assortedly either from the event or 
from the canonical legal fact.  
 
The change of the establishing norm resulting in 1993 means the better 
prevailing of the ecclesiastical Party’s concordatarian intention, even though 
that the automatic establishing is coming from the matrimonial bond (vinculum 
matrimoniale). Such a way the canonical conditions of establishing the bond 
(vinculum) are automatically prevailing in the secular legal order as well. 
Hence, the agreement means, in the same time the whole canonical legal 
figure’s prevailing in the secular legal order.  
 
2.1.2. Conditions of the secular legal effects (conditions ad validitatem) 
 
2.1.2.1. Reasons of the conditions 
In my view, not the appearing of conditions is unusual, but the lack of them in 
the first two agreements (Italy 1929, Austria 1933). It is obvious, that the eccle-
siastical and the secular legislators have other points in definition of conditions 
of validity of marriage (impedimentum). It would be difficult to examine it in 
details, since all national law thinks about it differently to some extent, according 
to their cultural particularity, to the momentary general agreement as well as the 
state of legal development in that country. The canon law however, being a 
sacral law, takes theologically determined points as well into consideration 
beyond the natural law, in other words the revealed law. The certain secular 
legal orders cannot construe these latter ones, and the natural law can differently 
be approached (e.g. in its theory of law it can be disputed that there are such 
norms, etc.), first of all on a basis of the social agreement taking shape on this. 
 It is logical in any case that the differences among the legal orders are 
appearing in the concordatarian law as a collision law. It would also be logical 
as well that this concordatarian law was taking shape along the differences of 
the matrimonial impediments used by legal orders. However, this did not 
happen in this way.  
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2.1.2.2. Transcription24 and answering the secular law  
 
SECTIONING 
 Ad validitatem conditions started with the Portuguese agreement of 1940. 
As regards to the transcription and the correspondence of the secular law, the 
turn of the 70’s and 80’s was a mile stone. Before this, the transcription was 
the ad validitatem condition, after this the conditions defined in the secular law 
will be mentioned. The Croatian agreement of 1996 brings again something new; 
it leaves out completely the transcription as an ad validitatem condition. These 
two points are dividing the changes in time of the codification’s tendency into 
three sections. In the 80’s and the first half of 90’s, both conditions were used.  
 From this main tendency, the Estonian agreement of 1998 is an exception, 
in which the transcription appears again instead of the impediments according to 
the secular law. As it seems, in this agreement the Spanish-Portuguese model 
returns. 
 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
 1. No conditions: 
 In the first two agreements, which include matrimonial law as well (Italian 
agreement of 1929 and the Austrian one of 1933), there are not any ad validitatem 
conditions. The Italian concordat-revision already includes certain conditions, 
so this seems now to be the strongest agreement from the ecclesiastical Party’s 
point of view (beyond the agreements after 1993, which are on a basis of 
automatic mechanism). 
 2. The only condition is the transcription: 
 In the Portuguese agreement of 1940, the criterion is the transcription 
into the civil register in a proper sense; namely an administrative work. Taking 
literally the text this means that only the canonical impediments are regulating 
the secular validity of canonical marriages, the secular laws do not effect it. 
This is in all similar facts regarding to all agreements where only the tran-
scription is the condition. As it will be clear, this is only formal. 
 3. The transcription and the secular laws: 
 The Italian agreement of 1984 is first mentioning the secular laws besides 
the transcription, as an ad validitatem condition, so the canonical marriages 
bond from this time have civil validity under a dual regime. In this agreement, 
  
 24 This usage of the word is there in the agreement of Malta (1993. Art. 2.). One of the 
languages of this agreement is English and in the Appendix it can be checked (under 
A.2.3.3. deferred transcription). 
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only the transcription is the formal condition, but the correspondence of the 
secular laws is the condition of this.  
 In the Maltese agreement, the “handing over” (transmission) of the act is the 
condition, which will (obviously) be examined by the secular registry office 
on the basis of the secular laws. In the Polish agreement of 1993, the secular 
impediments are in the first place, by themselves, as a part of the collision law, 
and not in such a way that the secular registry officer was to apply at the tran-
scription (albeit, the secular officer is clearly applying in practice). From the point 
of view of the codification technique this is clearer than the Maltese agreement.  
 4. Only the secular laws: 
 Here the transcription became superfluous, as an ad validitatem condition, 
and it will be sufficient to mention it among the further rules of the procedure. 
The Polish agreement of 1993, however still include it, and only from the 
Croatian one of 1996 onwards has been left out, as we can see it in the Latvian, 
Lithuanian and Slovakian agreements of 2000 as well.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 ad 2. When the transcription is the only condition, it is not clear, whether 
the civil register’s officer was allowed to ponder the transcription on its merits. 
A debate arose about it if the state officer is obliged to ponder it, since he/she 
is allowed to register what answers the conditions defined in the secular law. 
However it is also possible to argue in that case, that if the possibility of 
pondering in merits is not in the concordatarian law, he/she is not allowed to 
do it (stricte interpretatio), since this would restrict the legal claim for the civil 
effects of those who are living in a canonical bond which came into existence 
by the concordatarian law. And a right to be restricted is only possible in an 
explicit way. Such legal disputes are probably resolved by the common inter-
pretation clause which is used in the final provisions, or, tacitly, in the practice.  
 ad 3. The matrimonial impediment by the secular law and the transcrip-
tion, as a dually applicated condition, is the strongest legal construction from 
the secular Party’s point of view. This practically resolves the dilemma and 
declares that the sate register’s officer must ponder in its merit. Therefore, not all 
canonical bonds obtain a transcription. The contributor who makes the exami-
nation of the engages before the contraction, whether he knows that the future 
bond will not gain the secular recognition on the basis of the secular impedi-
ments, he cannot refuse the contribution at the contraction, because the parties 
have a canonical legal claim of taking the sacrament, which is just rejectable 
referring to a legal canonical impediment.25 As it follows from the different 
  
 25 CIC 1058. 
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matrimonial impediments of the two legal orders (and moreover this difference 
is varies always from country to country), there is a disparity between the bondable 
judged or valid bonds from the part of the two legal orders. Hence, if the civil 
register’s officer decides upon the transcription of the bond according to impedi-
ments of the secular law, thus this is a job made as one by the authorities.  
 In the Italy 84/826 the civil register’s officer examines literally the possibility 
of transcription; according to the Malta 93/1 and the Poland 93/10, it is already 
seen that the national law recognises or do not the canonical bond. This is an 
important change from a formal (codificational) point of view but regarding 
that the transcription is an ad validitatem condition in all these agreements as; 
the civil register’s officer always decides as an authority.  
 ad 4. The Croatia 96/16 (the Latvia 2000/8, the Lithuania 2000/13 and the 
Slovakia 2000/10) do not show formal development, so up to the Maltese and 
the Polish agreement, the legal figure of the concordatarian law was done. The 
transcription became weightless among the further rules, it is a mere admini-
stration, and is not the decision of the authorities. In this way, the canonical 
matrimonial bond is not on the basis of the discretional right of the civil register’s 
officer, but it is qualified as an objective legal basis.  
 To sum it up, it is apparent in the concordatarian law of a decade, how the 
collision law between the two legal orders concerning the ad validitatem 
matrimonial conditions shaped up from the practical approach to the clearer, 
legally more correct codification, in other words to the collisionary correspon-
dence between the two legal orders.  
 
2.1.3. Joint examination of the establishing norm of the legal effect and the 
  ad validitatem conditions  
 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
 1. First type: 
 a) The so called “recognising” agreements (all the agreements of the Spanish-
Portuguese cultural circle, the Italian agreement of 1984 and the Maltese one 
of 1993) all give a discretional (of the authorities) right to the civil register’s 
officer, and the secular legal effects are originating from the event (from the 
declaration of matrimonial consensus).  
 b) There is an exception: the system of agreements concluded with Colombia 
(Colombia 42/note, Colombia 73/3). The expressions in these agreements tightly 
interpreting the text, do not fit in the category of conditions ad validitatem, but 
in further rules of transcription (conditio ad liceitatem). These oblige the state 
  
 26 The structure of this shorter way of signing is: Country Year/Article.  
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official to transcript the bond on the basis of the act that had been sent over 
in the required form, which means that, his/her discretional right has been 
limited to the rules of the form of sending over, so he/she does not have any 
discretional right in merit.  
 2. Transitional type: 
 The Polish agreement of 1993 which is the first of those stating the automati-
cally originating civil effects, establishes the civil effects from the canonical 
bond, while it applies the transcription between the conditions ad validitatem 
as well. With this duality, this is a transitional, and not a clear structure.  
 3. Second type: 
 The agreements mentioning only the secular matrimonial impediments are 
all composed with an automatic originating rule and they originate from the 
canonical vinculum.  
 It is already clear that in the Polish agreement (and the Estonian one which 
is hanging out in a chronological sense as well), which has a mixed construction, 
the originating automatism and the clearly objective legal conditions are going 
together.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 As it has been ascertained in both topics, the latter concordatarian legal 
figures, in both cases, were stronger for the ecclesiastical Party than the earlier 
ones. This joint statement is even more obvious. Thus, it is a mistake to see it as 
just a mere extensive growing of the negotiating strength of the ecclesiastical 
Party. Here, the change of the concordatarian system should be caught in act as 
well.  
 ad 1. First type: the mechanism using only the secular legal order: 
 The earlier 1) bending down verb “recognition”, 2) that the civil effect does 
not originate from the canonical legal fact but directly from the fact of the order 
of the reality, 3) this legal effect is attributed and granted by a sate official, so 
all these are manifestations of that approach, that here the state legal order is 
contracting an agreement with a system not qualified as a true, real legal 
order. As it can be seen, in this concordatarian construction, we can reach 
from the fact of the reality to the civil effects exclusively through a mechanism 
originated from the secular legal order, that is to say, we do not need the 
mechanism of the canon law. Therefore, here the canon law does not work as a 
legal order, it does not play any role, the secular law is doing everything.  
ad 2. Transitional type: 
 The transitional character of the Polish agreement of 1993 is apparent from 
more facts. As we can see, the Italian agreement and the Maltese one are not 
conspicuous in the Polish agreement, that the state officer decides on the 
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possibility of the transcription. However, from the whole phrase, it is evident 
that the canonical bond becomes effective in the secular legal order by the 
transcription. The composition already points towards the following section, 
while the mechanism of the whole norm works as it was in the earlier one.  
 The Estonian agreement of 1998 according to its time, brings the automatic 
legal effect, but to this, it makes the transcription as a condition, while the 
secular norms is not even mentioned. Besides this, it returns to the origin of 
secular effects from the fact of the celebration (declaration). The whole figure, 
as it regards its mechanism, is obviously a construction before the Italian 
agreement of 1984. Here the automatic origination of the civil effects is just a 
question of composition, as “it is automatic if the state official decides so”. In 
this case, it is clear now, that the secular Party did not allow the Croatian-
Latvian model.  
 The Estonian example shows, that the composition of the ad validitatem 
conditions gives the working mechanism of the legal construction, while the 
norm of the composition of the attribution is just a question of legal-diplomatic 
nature. It is not accidental, that the ecclesiastical Party firstly managed to bring 
the automatism into the agreement, and only afterwards could adjust the 
composition of the ad validitatem conditions, so that the automatism would 
really work as well as the Polish agreement shows.  
 ad 3. Second type: the mechanism using both legal orders: 
 Whereas, the construction of the Croatian, the Litvanian, the Slovakian 
and the Latvian agreements is 1) a canonical legal fact comes into being 
from a fact in the order of the reality through the mechanism of the canon law, 
2) which (the canonical legal fact) has itself legal effects on a basis of criteria 
of the “input (the canonical) legal order”.  
 
2.2. Further rules concerning the form of the contraction (conditions ad 
  liceitatem) 
 
Until now the examination of the norms focused on the ad validitatem 
conditions of the secular legal effects, and now the ad liceitatem conditions are 
examined. These must be observed during the contraction, however if they are 
not, thereby the secular legal effects come into existence.  
 
2.2.1. Proclamation of banns 
 
The aim of the proclamation of banns is to bring the intention of parties to the 
community’s knowledge, so that who knows a matrimonial impediment, could 
make it known. In the canon law, the Codex of 1983 does not give any order 
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on a universal level, but it entrusts it to the local bishop’s conferences to make 
local norms, considering the circumstances.27   
  
TEXT ANALYSIS 
 1. A rule of proclamation is only in the agreements of the first type, and it 
is not even there in all cases. The last norm of publication is in the Portuguese 
agreement of 1940, as an ad liceitatem condition. Later, it was left out or 
defined as an ad validitatem rule (see above Italy 85/4, Malta 93/1).  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 ad 1. Ad liceitatem conditions in the cases of the two legal figures: 
 a) In the case of the second type, the first, definitive part of the concor-
datarian legal construction (meaning the attributive norm and the conditions ad 
validitatem) the established construction has such a structure, by which the 
mechanism “before” the canonical bond (canonical legal fact) belongs exclu-
sively to the sphere of the authority of the canon law. This means, it is not 
logical to introduce ad liceitatem elements by the concordat in the mechanism 
“before” the canonical bond, since it might worsen the possibility of interpre-
tation. Obviously, both Parties can allow to insert, by international agreement, 
“foreign” elements in that mechanism which is fitted in the authority of its own 
legal order by the main figure, if this does not hurt the principals of its legal 
order. This would be a real compromise. As it seems, in the cases of the 
second type agreements the secular Party did not demand it.  
 b) It is easy to understand that this condition occurs in case of the first 
type. In this case, however there is not a real compromise, because the state 
makes the norm of publication obligatory just in its own jurisdiction; the 
ecclesiastical Party allows only that the state could comment an ad liceitatem 
condition on an act in face of the ecclesiastical authority.  
 
2.2.2. Instruction of engaged couple  
 
The future spouses must take part in instruction of engaged couple during a 
determined period, with the aim to study and to become aware of the teaching of 
the church upon the marriage.28 There is an other institution in the canon law 
as well, the examination of engages, which is done as a main role by the parish 
priest according to the place of contraction, in which the legal control takes 
  
 27 CIC 1067. 
 28 CIC 1063/2. 
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place according to the canonical impediments and prohibitions.29 The text of 
agreements does not determine the exact time of statements of the secular law.  
 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
 1. There is not any mentioning, 
 2. the collaborator reads from the secular code of law after the contraction,  
 3. during the instruction of engaged couple, the one who conducts the 
instruction makes it known. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 ad 1. and 2. First type agreements: 
 As it seems clearly from the distribution, in the first type of agreements 
either there is no reference to the information of secular legal effects, or the 
collaborator explains them after the contraction. It is evident, that it is the 
secular Party’s interest to be arranged this matter well in the legal construction. 
In the Austrian Agreement of 1933, there is no reference to this, which means 
the state Party applies that principal of law that the ignorance of law does not 
release anybody from its authority. The other one is a resolution of compromise. 
On the one hand the secular norms are made known by the contributor, by a 
person who is a holy service keeper (and not a state official), on the other hand 
he merely has to read the secular code of law, in such a way he does not do 
anything by his own conscious act. By this kind of resolution, the principle 
remains intact, according to which in case of the secular effect originated from 
the event the whole legal mechanism is unfolding in the secular legal order.  
 ad 3. Second type agreements: 
 a) In case of the agreements fitting in the second type, the situation is 
different. Firstly, the information takes place before the contract, secondly the 
person does the instruction of engaged couple who makes known the related 
secular legal norms as well (and is not simply reading the code of law), i.e. he 
is carrying out a secular function.  
 b) One could raise the question, why the secular norm should made known 
before the contract in the second type agreements. One could argue namely, 
that from the declaration of consensus, the marriage to the canonical bond is 
exclusively the canon law active (as it was seen by the publication, in the 
second type agreements case) and the secular law takes the realised canonical 
bond as a basis. Just in this case, the information about the secular norms should 
not be placed before the contraction, since those are not at all effective to this 
section.  
  
 29 CIC 1067, 1071. 
 IUS MATRIMONIALE CONCORDATARIUM 43 
  
 The norm of the instruction of engaged couple in a tight sense allows two 
mechanisms: 1) two different effects of the sole declaration of matrimonial 
consensus are originating one at a time in the two legal orders, 2) the originating 
canonical bond has secular legal effects at the same time as well. In any of these 
two cases, the parties to be intermarried have to be aware of the secular effects 
of their legal act. From which of these two is the one (to say the Parties which 
choose of these) is clear from the composition’s form of the concordatarian 
main figure. It is discernible that the Estonian agreement has choosen the 1., 
the other three have choosen the 2. And as we see in fact, in the Estonian 
agreement, there isn’t any norm of the engaged couple (whereas, all the agree-
ments are less detailed), only in the case of the other three ones.  
 Relating to the tactics of the Parties, we can point out that the ecclesiastical 
Party has chosen what we called at the publication’s paragraph as a tactics of 
compromise. The former three agreements have permitted namely to fit in 
secular legal elements which sphere makes part unambiguously of the canonical 
legal order. In return for this a valuable gesture has been received: a holy 
service keeper person is doing a secular function. This is not a problem for the 
secular Party, because that person is a citizen of it.  
 
2.2.3. Invitation of an official of the state  
 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
 1. The Colombia 42/6 shows the whole form, which is explainable on its 
own. To explain the Spain 53 Add. Prot. 23 No. 1. we need the main rule in the 
former agreement of 1941, which still has the authority and the interpretation 
of which is this.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 ad 1. 
  a) As a requirement, the presence of a state official at the contract is attached 
to the first type structure. This enforces the statement that these agreements are 
really originating the secular legal effects to the event. It is obvious, that in 
case of the other main figure this would not have any reason, because if the 
concordatarian figure attaches the legal effect to the canonical bond, the 
ensuring of the event belongs exclusively to the authority of the canon law.  
   b) The aim from the part of the secular Party could be to ensure and control 
the existence of the declaration of the consensus. The interest of the ecclesias-
tical Party is to weaken this element, which presses the omission of the 
consideration of the canonical legal order. Some danger also existed that those, 
who were present at the contract and obviously did not understand the 
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sovereignty (independence) of legal orders, could feel, that the state official 
being present at the contract had some role during the establishing of the 
canonical bond. The ecclesiastical Party had to avoid all sorts of misinter-
pretations, this has a question of principle, and therefore we do not find such a 
role in any of other agreements. This role in this agreement is showing the 
secular Party’s force. 
 
2.3. Rules of administration 
 
2.3.1. Rules ad liceitatem of transcription  
 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
 The certain agreements attribute different importance to transcription as it 
follows: 
 1. it is included in the ad validitatem rules: (see there) 
  a) and includes rules that do not touch upon validity as well  
  b) there is no further regulation (Polish 1993) 
 2. the agreement does not rule it: 
 – entrusts it to the secular law (Croatian 1996/13 No 2, Slovakia 
2000/10 No 1, Latvian 2000/8 No 2) 
  – appoints a further agreement (Lithuania 2000). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 ad 1. First type agreements: 
 a) Most of the first type agreements besides the ad validitatem rules of 
transcription include ad liceitatem rules as well. These norms are to be explained 
as they regard the working mechanism of the legal figure like that of procla-
mation, in the first type of agreements.  
 By the first type agreements the secular effects were originating by the 
transcription, i.e. it was an interest of the ecclesiastical Party to regulate the 
transcription. The correct ruling of the transcription in the agreement could 
ensure that the contracts would gain their secular effects. It is obvious, the 
interest of the ecclesiastical Party was that the transcription would not be an ad 
validitatem condition (as it was previously seen), however ad liceitatem should 
be regulated in such a detailed manner as it was possible. 
 b) The Polish agreement of 1993 does not include such a norm. Therefore it 
may be concluded that it was present in the secular law or it was regulated after 
contracting the agreement. Hereby this agreement is a transitional one between 
the two types.  
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 ad 2. Second type agreements: 
 In this type, the transcription is regulated out of the agreement, or in the 
secular law, or they promise a future non-international agreement. The importance 
of the question is not so grave for neither Parties to put into the agreement. In 
this type, if a canonical bond does not have the secular registering, it is only a 
registration problem, to be corrected easily afterwards. But if the registration is 
missing in the earlier type, it means that the state has not recognised the bond. 
 
2.3.2. Coming into force of the secular legal effects 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 ad 1. “from the date of its celebration”: 
 During the period of the first type agreements, the evolution of the norm is 
showing that the negotiating power of the ecclesiastical Part is slightly gaining 
strength. The early norms relating the pure rules (which is in the Columbia’s 
agreement of 1973 Prot. fin. 4.) are slightly restricting; in the end of the period 
the Italian agreement of 1984 shows extension.  
 The structure of the first type agreement shows that if the agreement does 
not say it explicitly that the secular effects are valid from the date of the bond, 
then it can be interpreted that it is valid from the date of the transcription, 
because (in this model) the secular legal effect comes into being by the 
transcription itself, i.e. the appearance of this phrase in the agreement means 
the retroactive extension of the secular legal effect by the period before the 
transcription (to say from the bond). It is palpable from the wording of the 
notes of Columbia agreement of 1942 that it consciously emphasizes the 
retroactive extension of the transcription.  
 ad 2. “from the moment of its celebration”: 
 a) About the end of the period of the first type structure, in the agreements 
of Italy, Malta and Poland not the date but the moment of the bond is fixed in 
the text as a beginning of the terminus. This change of wording has not got any 
legal consequences because whole days are counted in all legal orders. This is 
rather only a wording difference, which just turns the wording style in that 
direction that it more emphasizes the bond itself. Therefore, it is preparing the 
way to that structure, in which the secular legal effect comes from the bond 
itself. It is obious, that this modification has taken place by the proposal of the 
ecclesiastical Party.  
 b) In the case of the second type structure (Croatia 96/13, Lithuania 2000/13, 
Latvia 2000/8) the explanation is not easy, because the canonical bond itself is 
empowered by the secular legal effects, which means that the origination of the 
secular legal effects is also bound to the existence of the canonical bond, so the 
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time of secular legal effects automatically derives from this. Thus, it is just 
tautology, in this case the term could be simply omittable. Thus the Slovakian 
agreement of 2000 does not contain it any more. 
 
2.3.3. Deferred transcription 
 
The legal reason of presenting the possibility of the deferred transcription in 
agreements is that the concluded canonical marriage, by all means, obtain its 
secular legal effects, i. e. the concordatarian intention would not fail by an 
administrational error.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 ad 1. The deferred transcription occurs in the case of the first type agree-
ments (except the Polish agreement of 1993). This is reasonable because in the 
second type legal figure it does not have any grave reason. Seeing that the 
concordatarian law binds the secular legal effects to the existence of the canonical 
bond, so whenever its administration can happen it has not got an effect on the 
force of secular legal effects. 
 It is clear that it was the ecclesiastical Parties’ interest to present this rule 
in the agreement and in the first type structure (in the weaker for the 
ecclesiastical Part) it indicates its relative force.  
 ad 2. In the first agreement among the second type agreements (Poland 
93/10) it is still there, but the criteria are already relatively lax, so the deferred 
transcription is possible practically unlimitedly. Afterwords there is no ruling 
on this. In the case of the marriages bound under the regime of these agree-
ments the interest of the matrimonial parties is that the transcription has been 
done, because this is how one can refer to it in the presence of the secular legal 
forum (albeit the secular legal effects are existing).  
 
It is worth noticing from a diplomatic point of view that the complex entireties 
of the rules connected to the transcription in the Italian agreement of 1984 are 
the strongest. The fact is surprising because this agreement has been bound 
firstly with Italy, secondly with a Christian democrat government.  
 
2.3.4. The effect of death to the transcription  
 
This point can be strange at first sight, since all matrimonial bonds come to an 
end in all legal orders if one of the matrimonial parties dies. So in this case the 
matter in issue is the deferred recognition of a matrimonial bond existed only 
in the canonical legal order. It is true, and it can be explained since there is a 
 IUS MATRIMONIALE CONCORDATARIUM 47 
  
legal interest of the living party to the past existence of the past marriage, and 
there is also the right of children (e.g. their legality, right of inheritance, etc). 
Furthermore, in the last case it needs the possibility to make the marriage valid 
in the case of death of any of the parties.  
 An other reason, not so much practical rather peculiar to the treating force of 
the representatives of legal orders is, that by including the possibility of the sub-
sequent convalidation the ecclesiastical Party takes an other step towards making 
the bond accepted (more precisely in that time the declaration of matrimonial 
consensus) as a more objective entity and making the way of understanding 
weaker as a “pure ceremony” (which is conspicuously inaccurate). 
 
2.4. Suit law 
 
The church’s legal claim for judgement in matrimonial cases has been canonised 
firstly on the Council of Trident.30 The legal claim refers here not only to the 
sacramental aspect of the matrimony but generally, as a whole.31 We could 
expect that in the time when the single secular states have created their own 
matrimonial law, those have been competing with the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 
But the church did not consider it in this way. It did not hurt the church’s legal 
claim because 1) the marriage bond on the base of the secular state’s law is a 
non subsisting legal act from the church’s viewpoint, and obviously it does not 
violate the church’s legal claim if the state judges upon a legal act constructed 
by itself, 2) when earlier the ecclesiastical court judged on the non-sacramental 
consequences of the bond (inheritance, children’s legality, etc.) it came about 
because the profane legal order did not cover the whole issue of human’s life, 
so the church did not find the withdrawal from this area injurious.  
 It is a general principle and is held by all legal orders that a legal fact is judged 
on the base of the law of that legal order and is judged that a legal forum has to 
come into existence. Interstate agreements take this as an axiom and if they depart 
from it they must be regulated explicitly. The church’s above-mentioned behaviour 
shows that the church considers the ecclesiastical and secular matrimonial laws 
living side by side on a base of 1) the legal orders independency and 2) the 
principle that the canonical and the secular legal orders’ relationship is ruled 
by international public law. This behaviour made it possible that after the wave 
  
 30 Concilium Eocumenicum Tridentinum, Canones de sacramento matrimonii, Sessio 
XXIV, canon XII, 1563. XI. 11, in: Alberigo–Jouannau–Leonardi–Prodi: op. cit. 731.  
 31 Repeats the legal claim: Leo XIII., Litt. Enc. Arcanum, 1880. II. 10. in: Acta Sanctae 
Sedis, (1879–1880), 392. 
48 MIKLÓS RÓNAY 
  
of separation, the question could be easily managed on the base of inter-
national law.  
 As we have seen there are two ways to establishing the secular legal effects. 
The first type agreements are recognising the ecclesiastical declaration of 
matrimonial consensus by a legal act in the secular legal order. Therefore, this 
legal act is in the secular legal order and will be judged in that way. In the 
second type agreements the situation is twofold: the canonically formed 
declaration of matrimonial consensus (ecclesiastical celebration) causes the 
canonical matrimonial bond and this causes the secular legal effects as well. 
So it is clear, that the matrimonial bond exists in the canonical legal order 
hence it is to be judged in that way, while its secular legal effects are in the 
secular legal order, and the secular forum is to judge upon them. This principle 
just succeeds in such a clear way in the case of the Polish agreement.  
 
2.4.1. Theological elements 
In certain agreements some elements of the church’s teaching upon the marriage 
appear. In the earlier agreements this has taken place according to a formula, 
and the single agreements hardly differ from each other in the formulation of 
this term. The first phrase of this formula is a self-evident statement, because if 
the parties are contracting the marriage on the base of the canon law, it is 
morally evident that they consider these rules obligatory on settling its further 
legal effects before the secular forum as well. The presentation of the theo-
logical principles in agreements is in the order of the ecclesiastical Party to 
make this evidence more obvious. It is clear that this is related to the order of 
matrimonial suits, so it is worth dealing with it in the part of the suit law.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 ad 1. First type agreements: 
 a) In this case the situation is complex because of the mechanism. Here 
the secular effect comes into force by the decision of the registrar, so the only 
declaration of the matrimonial consensus causes the canonical bond and its 
analogue appears also in the secular legal order. The secular court has obviously 
an exclusive jurisdiction upon this, while upon the canonical bond the 
ecclesiastical court has the exclusive jurisdiction. This is the reason why the 
ecclesiastical Party has inserted into the agreement a part which reminds the 
parties to be married of their canonical duty. Such a way, it makes a legal 
effect to the canonical norm, which is sensible for the state as well, while this 
effect does not have any enforceability of the secular legal order itself. So this 
norm is rather only a commission without a sanction but the willingness of the 
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ecclesiastical Party is perceptible that upon the marriages bound according to 
the canon law the ecclesiastical forum could judge in an effective way.  
 b) From the Spanish agreement on it is not said that the parties to be 
married renounce the right for divorce but with the mentioning of the church’s 
teaching in the agreement, the secular Party knows about it. Anyway, it is not 
explicit, and from the Spanish agreement on it is important for the secular Party. 
In this time such a definition appears on the main figure of suit law, which 
does not preclude the possibility of the jurisdiction of the of secular forum upon 
bound marriages according to the canonical form (cf. chapter of Delimitation 
of the jurisdictional competences).  
 The above mentioned ambition of the ecclesiastical Party is failed, and it 
does not succeed either afterwards, which shows the secular Party’s force in 
these agreements.  
 ad 2. Second type agreements: 
 The form of the Polish agreement is substantially deferring from the earlier 
ones, because the rule in these is not related to the parties to be married, but 
the contracting Parties incure an obligation which means here the commitment 
of the Polish State. This norm does not strictly create law, it is just a declaration 
of an intention. Nota bene it is a declaration of intention related to a concrete 
ecclesiastical teaching, which is imaginable only in the post-modern time; 
national liberalism in the 19th century would not have had it. Phrases like this 
are even more frequent in the recent agreements.  
 
2.4.2. Provision of legal force for the adjudication of the ecclesiastical forum 
 
There are two possibilities for this: the delimitation of the jurisdictional 
competences or the provision of secular legal force for the decisions of the 
ecclesiastical forum. 
 
2.4.2.1. By delimitation of the jurisdictional competences 
This main figure of the suit law, in chapter 2.4.2.1.1. will demonstrate the transfer 
of the legal effect of the judgement of the ecclesiastical court in the secular 
legal order.  
 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
 1. It compels the contracting Parties: 
 a) The most evident way of this approach is, that the Parties declare in the 
agreement: the ecclesiastical court has the jurisdiction to judge upon the fact of 
a canonical marriage, the state by the same time takes on that its court declares 
itself not competent if somebody enters an action by this legal title. 
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 b) he above mentioned principle (legal facts are judged in that legal order 
in which they have come into existence) can be found in the clearest form in 
the Polish agreement of 1993.  
 2) It compels the matrimonial parties: 
 The other way of approach in codification is when not the contracting Parties 
but the matrimonial parties are obliged by the norm. Such shaped norms 
(Spanish 79/6, Malta 93/4 No. 2, Dominica 54/25 No. 2) are all including 
theological elements as well, as it was seen earlier.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 ad 1. The “recognise” phrase in the Austrian agreement of 1933 just means 
that the ecclesiastical court is competent, but does not preclude that of the 
secular court. However, the intention of the contracting Parties that the legal 
orders should be clearly distinguished is evident from other parts of the 
agreement, so it is just a lack of precision in wording.32 Agreements after the 
Austrian treaty have already eliminated this possibility of misinterpretation. 
The “exclusive competence” and the “are reserved” phrases are equivalent (only 
the ecclesiastical court is competent to judge upon it), so they are not variations.  
 The Maltese agreement of 1993 mentiones the competence of the ecclesias-
tical forum only, and leaves out the exclusivity, and as it will further be evident, 
the Parties do not interpret it exclusively as well. This formula is similar to the 
Austrian one of 1933, but the context interprets it right in the opposite direction.  
 ad 2. The conception of structuring the norm which obliges the matrimonial 
parties reinforces and extends the obligations in the canon law such a way that 
these would not be infringable using the other way of thinking of the secular 
law. This confirmation is obtained by mentioning the theological teaching about 
the sacrament of marriage, which makes the base of the canonical matrimonial 
law in the agreement. One can see that the Spanish agreement of 1979 and the 
Dominican one of 1954 which contain the renunciation and the theological 
teaching together are drafting loosely here, and the Maltese agreement of 1993 
makes the parties to be married renounced here, namely written. Now here is 
the reason of legal relevance of mentioning the theological terms.  
 The mechanism here is theoretically double: 1) the parties to be married by 
the celebration itself (ipso facto) or separately, in a written form renounce the 
right to ask the divorce from the secular court, 2) the state Party is not allowed 
to receive a legal action which is conflicting with the agreement signed by 
  
 32 “Ecclesiastical and secular courts ought to provide for each other legal aid all on 
its own jurisdiction’s field.” Austria 1933/7. 5. §. 
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itself. In wide sense, this way of approach obligates the secular court as well to 
reject the legal action.  
 The situation is not so clear if we have a closer look at it. Among these three 
agreements only the Spanish one of 1979 does not contain either in the theo-
logical part, nor here that the parties take on by the celebration itself they 
will not ask the divorce. The Italian agreement of 1984 belongs to this 
category as well. It does not contain any explicit phrases about the delimitation 
of competences. Both agreements are restricting themselves and refer to the 
catholic teaching, which is laying emphasis on maintaining the jurisdiction 
upon spiritual goods to the ecclesiastical forum. This is, as I see, too lax a role 
to obligate effectively the state Party to reject the legal actions. It seems too lax 
especially looking at the Maltese agreement of 1993. This contains a reference 
to the renunciation of parties in one place, and in an other place, however, it 
refers to an earlier sentence of the secular court based on a caput nullitatis 
(grounds of nullity), which is not opposite to the caput nullitatis of the sentence 
of the ecclesiastical court. Thus such things, in fact, can be found despite of 
the explicit mentioning of the renunciation. Therefore, it does not necessarily 
follow mean that the secular Party would take on the reject of legal action if 
the agreement contains the parties obligating renunciation.  
 
2.4.2.1.1. Attribution of the secular legal effects  
 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
 1. In the procedure of the first group, the sentence will only be communicated 
and the secular court declares the secular legal effects. This is the same way as 
it was in the case of the automatic method of legal effects (second type). 
 2. In the other group, the secular court has a real sphere of authority of 
examination, in merits. This is parallel to the recognisional way of transfer of the 
matrimony. In the Spanish agreement of 1979, the aspects of the examination 
are undefined in detail, in the Italian one of 1984 and in the Maltese one of 
1993, they are all enumerated in a taxative way. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 ad 1. The Spanish agreement of 1953 is using a special way of procedure: 
to reach the secular legal effects in the future this role makes it obligatory, that 
during the ecclesiastical suit procedures one of the parties asks the secular 
court to regulate the future secular effects of the ecclesiastical sentence. It is 
disquieting whether the two procedures authority personals mutual influence 
could be eliminated. 
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 ad 2. The Spanish agreement of 1979 is the strongest one from the state 
Party’s viewpoint. The guidelines are undetermined and it allows the secular 
court to examine the case in a wider scale, since it is possible to rehear the case 
in its merits as well, or, at least, the criticism of the sentence.  
 The Italian agreement of 1984 and the Maltese one of 1993 enumerates all 
the competences of the secular court; it cannot examine either less or more. Both 
agreements make sure the right of defence of the parties and the examination 
of the competence of the ecclesiastical court. It is evident, that the secular 
court claims the right of the examination of defence, but the examination of the 
competence of the court could be rather strange. It means namely that the 
secular court demands an account of the application of a canonical norm. This 
can be an interesting precedent under the aspect that the secular forum can 
adopt canonical norms (as it is a practice that the ecclesiastical forum adopts 
the norms of the local secular laws).  
 
It is furthermore appearing from the detailed enumerations that both the Italian 
agreement of 1984 and the Maltese one of 1993 were discussed for a long time 
and they are results of a compromise. E.g. the Italian agreement deals with the 
decision made by the ecclesiastical court as a foreign sentence, which shows 
the ecclesiastical Party’s force. This is albeit a theoretical question, because it 
does not generally cause the secular legal effects of ecclesiastical courts with 
other decisions brought in other cases, it only relates to matrimonial sentences. 
However, it is sure, this term was not used in other agreements before, and this 
is the first appearance of this way of thinking. The Maltese agreement contains 
a phrase, that the secular court cannot examine the sentence in merits, which 
means a relative force in this agreement-group. Re-examination of the merits is 
possible on a basis of the Italian and the Spanish agreements, which show the 
secular Party’s force in these agreements.  
 The fact that the Maltese agreement is a solution of compromise is apparent 
also from the phenomenon that the validation of the secular effects of resolu-
tions of dispensation (i.e. a decision made by a dicasterium of the Holy See, so 
this is not a local ecclesiastical court’s sentence) is reduced to formal, so the 
importance of the diplomatic hierarchy is high in this case.33 In this agreement, 
there is a pair of rules, which is unknown in others. This pair of rules says that 
on the one hand a secular court is not allowed to receive a legal action under 
such a legal title on which ecclesiastical court has already brought definitive 
sentence, on the other hand a secular court of appeal is not allowed to declare 
  
 33 “The Highest Court orders the recognition of the decree if it is about a matrimony 
bond according to the Catholic Church’s canonical norms.” Malta, 1993/7. 
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secular legal effects for such a definitive sentence of an ecclesiastical court 
whose legal title was already used by a sentence of a secular court. This pair of 
rules is apparently asymmetrical, since the secular court is not allowed to deal 
with it at all, but the ecclesiastical one can, but it will not have any secular 
legal effect. This sort of solutions shows the ecclesiastical Party’s force.  
 It is worth mentioning with regard to the Maltese agreement, that its figure 
(structure) uses too much instruments, so it is too complex and rather difficult 
to interpret. This is not conductive to the legal security. In shaping up the 
figure there is a phrase delimitating jurisdictions (obligates the contracting 
Parties), the another one which obligates matrimonial parties, and although 
both (separately as well) are to be interpreted that the secular court does not 
have any jurisdiction, however it takes it into consideration elsewhere. This 
agreement does not seem to be the most excellent one from this point of view, 
but there are shortly drafted, axiomatically formulated phrases, which can help 
the interpretation of other agreements.  
 
2.4.2.2. Providing secular legal force for the adjudication 
The main figure of the suit law in this group is implicit. There is not any formula 
of recognition, only “the sentences and the decisions are communicated”.  
 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
 1. The Maltese agreement of 1993 is a transitional form: beyond the 
delimitation of jurisdiction, there is a new element, the recognition of the 
sentences and of the decisions of dispensation. 
 2. In the Croatian, Slovakian and Lithuanian agreements there are not any 
delimitations of jurisdiction, so the question is ruled only by the transcription 
of decisions. 
 
COCLUSIONS 
 ad 1. It would be the ecclesiastical Party’s aim to make this rule present, 
and it might want to shift it towards a new structure of agreement. This is 
supported by the tendency that the agreements following it use only the recog-
nition of the decisions.  
 ad 2. The new formula is the clearest in the Croatian agreement of 1996. 
The decisions are communicated to the secular Party and are validated by its 
court. There might be some difficulties in the interpretation of their wording. 
The term “put into effect, adempimento” on the one hand stresses that the 
secular court does not have any right of examination, on the other hand the 
“according to the legal norms of the Republic of Croatia” term could mean that 
it has a right of examination, whether the sentence is according to the practice 
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of the secular administration of justice. As I see it is not the point in this case, 
but it has to be interpreted together with the 9§ of the Maltese agreement of 
1993, which contains a more unambiguous rule: on its merits, the secular court 
cannot intervene in the ecclesiastical sentence, but its further secular effects 
(which can be rather complicated) has to shape up according to the law of the 
Republic of Croatia.34  
 The formula in the Lithuanian agreement of 2000 is not so clear, because 
instead of the “put into effect” there is the more active “regulates”, however 
this activity is to be restricted, according to the above-mentioned things, to the 
further effects of the ecclesiastical sentence. 
 The mechanism of the Slovakian agreement of 2000 at the first look seems 
to be the same as that of the Lithuanian one. It can cause some difficulties that 
cannot be found in any of the earlier formulas before the administrational rules 
of transfer by which the Parties attached secular legal force to the ecclesiastical 
sentences and decisions by the agreement. But these phrases, without a main 
figure, can have a totally different meaning. In this form, they mean that the 
sentences are communicated to the Slovakian state and it decides about the 
taking over as it likes. In fact, if an ultrapositivist Slovakian judge looks at this 
text, he/she might easily say this. But why this matter is there in the agreement 
since the Slovakian state, after a legal supervision, can take over whatever decisions 
are made in a foreign legal order without any international agreement. As I see, 
the mere mentioning of the administrational rules of transfer in the text means 
that the concordatarian intention of the Parties was to agree upon the transfer 
of the ecclesiastical sentences. Consequently, there is the earlier main figure 
(implicitly) and in such a way, the whole regulation works in fact as it can be 
seen in the case of the Lithuanian agreement of 2000: the secular judge cannot 
interfere, on its merit, in the decision of the ecclesiastical court, and his/her 
activity is limited to the attachment of secular legal effects to the sentence.  
 
To sum it up, the following can be ascertained: 
 1. the recognition of the decisions of the ecclesiastical forum is clear from 
the concordatarian intention, 
 2. this recognition is full-scale, namely it does not only extend over the 
sentences of nullity, but over the peculiar decisions of ecclesiastical suit law 
(like privilegium paulinum, dispensatio super ratum, etc.). This shows the treating 
force of the ecclesiastical Party. 
  
 34 “… the secular legal effects are regulated by secular laws.” Malta, 1993/9. 
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 3. The secular forum must take over these decisions without a right of 
pondering, on its merit, and it must formulate the legal consequences according 
to its own legal order. This shows the treating force of the ecclesiastical Party. 
 4. The lack of the delimitation of jurisdictions, the secular forum (in its own 
order) can divorce married couples (which does not have any interference with 
the ecclesiastical legal order). This shows the treating force of the secular Party. 
 
2.4.3. Tendencies in the suit law 
 
Summing up it can be ascertained, that the unequivocal direction cannot 
unambiguously experienced in the suit law which could be seen in the case of 
the secular legal effects validation of the ecclesiastical marriage, namely in the 
rising of the ecclesiastical Party’s treating force.  
 1. The competence of the secular forum: 
 a) Until the Columbian agreement of 1973 the norm shaping up the main 
figure was built on the delimitation of jurisdictions. In that time, all agree-
ments were precluding the jurisdiction of the secular forum, which shows the 
ecclesiastical Party’s force.  
 b) From the middle of the 1970s, the secular Party insists on the right of 
judgement upon such a matrimonial bonds. Hence, after the Spanish agreement 
of 1979 only the Polish one of 1993 contains exclusive ecclesiastical juris-
diction, in the rest of the agreements the secular courts have jurisdiction as 
well, which signs the secular Party’s force. 
 2. Concerning the coming into existence of the secular legal effects of the 
sentences of the ecclesiastical court the tendency is complex: 
 a) Until the Columbian agreement of 1973, it is practically an administra-
tional procedure after a canonical supervision, which takes place before the 
publication of decisions. 
 b) In the middle of the ‘70s there was a change in this respect as well: the 
secular court received the examinational right. This is the case in the Spanish 
agreement of 1979 (here the secular court can intervene in its merits as well), 
in the Italian one of 1984 and in the Maltese one of 1993 (formal examination 
on the base of canonical and secular law). 
 c) In the newest Croatian, Latvian, Slovakian and Lithuanian agreements 
this question is not ruled, because the main figure of suit law is defined such a 
way that the sentence of the ecclesiastical court on base of the agreement itself 
(ipso iure) has secular legal effects, the task of the secular court is only to 
endow it with content (property rights, etc.) according to the secular law.  
 It can be seen, that the change of the mechanism occured in the suit law 
approximately at the same time, after the beginning of the ‘90s, when it was 
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in the matter of the contraction as well. The takeover of the decisions of the 
ecclesiastical forum became automatic too, but the ecclesiastical Party renounced 
the exclusivity of the jurisdiction.  
 
 
3. Summary 
 
In this essay I have set the aim to examine the matrimonial parts in the Holy 
See’s international agreements, and to show characteristics and tendencies in 
them. I have chosen from the agreements the parts with the same functions and 
I have compared their legal structure, their legal terms, and their technique of 
codification. The legal analysis can and should be examined in the context of 
history, concerning cultural circles, history of politics, etc. This makes on one 
hand the examining system more compound, on the other hand it helps to find 
the legal characteristics from outside of law.  
 Norms concerning matrimonial law can be found on the one hand only in a 
smaller part of agreements, on the other hand the relating chapters are generally 
not too long. This provides the possibility for a detailed text analysis, in which 
I practically presented the whole relevant legal material, and I examined it 
entirely and in detail.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 1. During the examination I came to the conclusion, that in the early and 
late agreements two different main figures (models) were used. In the case of  
the first model, the Parties agreed, that the secular law would attribute to the 
fact of the ecclesiastical matrimonial contraction (celebration) the legal effect 
of the secular matrimony. In the second model, the concordatarian law itself 
attributes secular legal effects to the canonical bond (vinculum matrimoniale) 
which has come into existence in the celebration (declaration of the matrimonial 
consensus). In the first case besides the mechanism of the canon law the 
secular law was working as well (both in their own legal order), in the second 
case the mechanism of the secular law has been built upon the result of the canon 
law’s mechanism. By this, not only the canonical contraction is recognised by 
the agreement, but the canonical matrimonial law as well.  
 2. This change (after the beginning of 1990s) of the main figure in the suit 
law can be observed as well. The takeover of the decisions in the ecclesiastical 
forum became here automatic as well, and from the sentences of nullity it 
extended to the declarations of dispensatio as well. 
 
* * * 
 IUS MATRIMONIALE CONCORDATARIUM 57 
  
As it is discernible from the examination, the newer type of the concordatarian 
treaties, containing matrimonial law, was stipulated by turns with the countries 
of Eastern-Central-Europe. The reason for that is that these countries considered 
to re-establish their relations, interrupted after the World War II., with the 
Catholic Church as an important part of their social transition. It is characteristic 
that the matrimonial sections constitute more and more a constant part of the 
treaties stipulated with the Holy See of these transitional countries. A few 
years ago a possible stipulation of a treaty containing such a part regarding 
Hungary came up as well.  
 
 
4. Appendix  
 
Numbering of chapters in the Appendix (after a “A”) follows that in the main text. 
 
A.2.1. The attribution of the legal effect  
 
A.2.1.1. The legal effect’s establishing norm 
 
FIRST TYPE agreements: 
 
Italy  1929/34 “The Italian State recognises the secular legal effects of the 
sacrament of marriage provided by the canon law” 
 
Austria  1933/7, 
Italy  1984/8 
“The Republic of Austria recognises the secular legal effects of 
marriages contracted in accordance with the canon law.” 
Portugal  1940/22, 
Spain  1953/23, 
Colombia  1942/4, 
Dominica  1954/15,  
Spain I.  1979/6, 
Malta  1993/1 
 
 
“The Portuguese State recognises the secular legal effects of 
marriages celebrated in accordance with the norms of canon law.” 
 
 
 
SECOND TYPE agreements: 
 
Poland  1993/10 “... the catholic marriage brings about the effects of the marriage 
bond provided by the Polish law.” 
Croatia  1996/13, 
Latvia  2000/8 
“The canonical marriage … produces the legal effects by the law 
of the Republic of Croatia.” 
Estonia  1998/8 “Marriages celebrated in the Catholic Church, […] have civil 
effect.”  
Lithuania  2000/13 “A canonical marriage will have civil effects pursuant to the legal 
acts of the Republic of Lithuania” 
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Slovakia  2000/10 “The marriage contracted in accordance with the Canon Law … 
has on the territory of the Republic of Slovakia the same force and 
the same legal consequences as it has the marriage contracted in 
accordance with civil form.” 
 
A.2.1.2. Conditions of the secular legal effects (conditions ad validitatem) 
 
2. just the TRANSCRIPTION: 
 
Portugal  1940/22 “provided that the act of the marriage is carried over the competent 
authority of the secular state”  
Colombia  1942 notes “… the registration of the competent civil registry office will be a 
necessary condition that the catholic marriage reach civil legal 
effects”  
Spain  1953 Additional 
Protocol 23. 
[to recognise the civil legal effects] “... will be sufficient that the 
contraction of the marriage would be written into the competent 
civil registry”  
Colombia  1973/7 “To the validity of this recognition the competent ecclesiastical 
authority hands the copy of the act over to the competent functionary 
of the State who has to send a note to the civil registry.” 
Spain I.  1979/6 “To the complete recognition (of marriage) the registration into 
the civil Registry is necessary …” 
Estonia  1998/8 “[have civil effect] upon registration and for which a certificate of 
marriage has been issued by the civil registry office […]”  
 
3. transcription AND to meet civil legal requirements as well: 
 
Italy  1984/8 [are recognised] 
with condition of: 
 1. is transcripted, 
 2. previous publishing the banns at the local authority,  
the transcription is not possible if: 
 1. lack of age according to civil laws, 
 2. no remedy impediment according to civil laws, 
Malta  1993/1 1. “ [… are recognised …] provided that:  
a) it clearly appears from a certificate issued by the Marriage 
Registrar that the banns required by civil law have been published, 
or that a dispensation from the same has been granted; such 
certificate shall constitute definitive and conclusive proof of the 
regularity of the banns or of the dispensation therefrom; 
b) the Parish Priest of the place where the marriage was celebrated 
transmits an original of the act of marriage to the Public Registry 
compiled in the form established by common accord between the 
Parties, and signed by the local Ordinary or the Parish Priest or their 
Delegate, who has officiated at the celebration of the marriage.  
2. The Holy See takes note that the Republic of Malta recognises 
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the civil effects of canonical marriages where no spouses and 
impediment exist which can cause the nullity of the marriage and 
that the stated civil law considers it as mandatory or not 
dispensable.” 
Poland  1993/10 [brings about the effects] if:  
1. no impediments between the parties according to the Polish law,  
2. “they unanimously manifest their intention willing to trigger 
such effects,  
3. it is transcripted”  
 
4. just to meet CIVIL LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: 
 
Croatia  1996/13 
Latvia  2000/8 
[produces the legal effects] if: 
“there are no civil impediments between parties to the contract and 
they meet the requirements stated by the laws of the Croatian 
Republic.”  
Lithuania  2000/13 
Slovakia  2000/10 
“ [will have civil effects …] provided there are no impediments to 
the requirements of the laws of the Republic of Lithuania.” 
 
A.2.1.3. The joint examination of the establishing norm of the legal effects and the 
conditions ad validitatem 
 
Colombia  1942 notes “...the State has to write into the civil register that canonical 
marriages, whose act was handed over in the adequate form by the 
competent ecclesiastical authority.” 
Colombia  1973/7 “...the competent ecclesiastical authority hands over the authentic 
copy of the Act to the competent official of the State who has to 
transcript it into the civil register.” 
 
A.2.2. Further rules concerning the form of the contraction (conditions ad 
 liceitatem) 
 
A.2.2.1. Publishing of banns 
 
Italy  1929/34, 
Portugal  1940/22 
“The publishing of banns […] has to take place beyond the parish 
at the local authority.” 
Portugal  1940/22 “It is allowed to contract the marriage without the previous publica-
tion of banns in danger of death, in case of imminent birth and the 
explicit authorisation of the ordinary because of grave moral motive.” 
 
Austria  1933/7 “These marriages (banns) are to be pubished according to the 
canon law. The Republic of Austria reserves the right to order the 
secular publication as well.” 
Colombia  1942/4 “The publication of a catholic marriage (banns) will be in the 
form prescribed by the canon law; but the State can order the 
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secular publication as well and, to the same aim, the parties to 
contract are obligated to inform the competent official about their 
intention to contract a catholic marriage.” 
 
A.2.2.2. The instruction of the engaged couple 
 
Italy  1929/4, 
Colombia  1942/8, 
Italy  1984/8 
“The parish priest immediately after the celebration explanes to 
spouses the secular legal effects, reading the adequate articles to 
the parties treating the rights and obligations of spouses of the 
secular code of law.”  
 
Croatia  1996/13, 
Poland  1993/10 No. 2., 
Lithuania  2000/13 
“The preparation of a canonical marriage includes the explanation 
of the future spouses the teaching of the church about the dignity, 
the unity and the undissolubility of the sacrament of the marriage 
as well as the civil legal effects of the bond of marriage according 
the laws of the Republic of Croatia.” 
 
A.2.2.3.  Invitation of an official of the state 
 
Colombia  1942/6 
 
 
 
                  1942/7 
“For the effects in the Civil Register the State can order, that one of 
its officials would present at the religious celebration, however in 
no case the presence of the said official is necessary that the 
marriage produces legal effects.” 
“Before the celebration the priest who will assist requires authentic 
copy of parties that certifies that the Civil Regiter’s authorized 
official is invited to day, hour and place to the ceremony. Forbear 
from requiring inviation of the official is possible in case of 
marriage in articulo mortis, on missionary territory if the place of 
celebration is farther than 20 km from the residence of the 
official.” 
Spain  1953 Add. Prot. 23. 
No. 1. 
“In no case the presence of state official to the celebration of 
canonical marriage will be considered as a necessary condition to 
the recognition of civil effects.” 
 
A.2.3. Rules of administration 
 
A.2.3.1 Rules ad liceitatem of transcription  
 
Italy 1929/34 “[The parish priest after the celebration …] issues the marital act 
whose entire copy in 5 days should be handed over the local 
authority to be transcripted into the civil states’s register.” 
Colombia 1942/8 “Aftermath the parish priest or his delegate, the parties, the 
witnesses and the state official subscribe the act in 2 copies. 
One of them the parish priest hands over to the authorised state 
official of the Civil Registrar in 6 days after the contraction.”  
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Portugal  1940/22, 
Italy  1984/8, 
Malta  1993/2, 
 
 
“The parish priest in 3 days hands an entire copy of the act of 
marriage over to the competent office of civil registrar for tran-
scription; the transcription has to be carried out in 2 days and and 
the competent official on the following day of the transcription 
declares it to the parish priest indicating the date of transcription.” 
Spain I.  1979/6 “[the recognition of secular effects] ... which is realised by the 
simple presentation of the ecclesiastical certificate of the existence 
of the marriage.”  
 
Croatia  1996/13 No. 2., 
Slovakia  2000/10, 
Latvia  2000/8 
“The way and the until time to be registered in the civil register a 
canonical marriage is prescribed by the adequate law of the 
Republic of Croatia.”  
Lithuania  2000/13 No. 2. “The time and manner of recording a canonical marriage in the 
civil register shall be established by the competent authority of the 
Republic of Lithuania, in co-ordination with the Conference of 
Lithuanian Bishops.” 
 
A.2.3.2. Coming into force of the secular legal effects 
 
Portugal  1940/23, 
Spain  1953 Add. Prot. 23. 
No. 4. 
“The marriage produces all its civil legal effects from the date of its 
celebration if the transcription takes place within 7 days. If does 
not, it produces effects to a third person only from the date of its 
transcription.” 
Colombia  1942 Notes “the catholic marriage does not produce civil legal effects from the 
date of its celebration unless through the writing into the competent 
civil register.” 
Colombia  1973           
Add. Prot. 7. 
“The civil effects of the properly transcripted catholic marriage come 
into force from the date of the celebration of the declared marriage.” 
 
Spain I.  1979/6 
 
“The civil effects of the canonical marriage come into existence 
from the moment of the celebration.” 
Italy  1984/8 “The marriage has civil effects from the moment of the celebration, 
even if the state official because of whatever cause has been late 
with the implementation of the transcription.” 
Mata  1993/1, 
Poland  1993/10 
“[The civil effects are recognised …] from the moment of the 
celebration [...]” 
 
Croatia  1996/13, 
Lithuania  2000/13, 
Latvia  2000/8 
“[The catholic marriage …] from the moment of its celebration 
[produces the civil effects …]”  
 
A.2.3.3. Defered transcription 
 
Spain  1953 Add. Prot. 23. 
No. 2., 
“The transcription of a catholic marriage which has not been 
recorded into civil registers immediately after the celebration, 
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Colombia  1973 Add. Prot. 
7. No. 1. 
is possible to be implemented at any time and at the request of 
anybody of parts or who has a legitimate interest.”  
“To do this the presentation of an authentic copy of the 
ecclesiastical act will be sufficient.”  
Italy  1984/8 The deferred transcription is possible if: 
– at the request of both parties or of one of them with the other’s 
knowledge and without his/her opposition, 
– both remain uninterruptedly in independent status since the 
marriage, 
– third party’s legally obtained interests are not damaged. 
Malta  1993/2 “Should the transmission of the act of marriage not be effected 
within the established time limit, it shall be the duty of the Parish 
Priest to effect the same as soon as possible. The spouses, or either 
of them, always retain the right to demand such transmission. Late 
transmission shall not be an obstacle to transcription.”  
 
Poland  1993/10 “[in 5 days …] this deadline becomes extended if has not been 
observed because of a vis maior until its end.”  
 
A.2.3.4. Death’s effect to the transcription  
 
Portugal  1940/23, 
Spain  1953 Add. Prot. 23. 
No. 3., 
Colombia  1973 Add. Prot. 
7. No. 1. 
 
“Death of one or both of the parties does not hinder the 
transcription.” 
 
A.2.4. Suitlaw 
 
A.2.4.1. Theological elements 
 
Portugal  1975 Add. 
Prot. I., 
Portugal  1940/24, 
Dominica  1954/15  
No. 2., 
 
 
 
Spain I.  1979/6 
No. 3., 
Poland  1993/11 
“The spouses with the celebration itself of a catholic marriage 
assume responsibility in face of the Church for adher to the 
regulating canonical norms, particulary to the essential attributes. 
The Holy See reinforces the teaching of the Catholic Church about 
the indissolubility of the bond of the marriage, remind the spouses 
who have contracted a catholic marriage of the heavy duty 
concerning them, not to use their civil faculty of the request of the 
divorce.” 
The same without the last clause. 
 
Italy  1984/8 “[…] the Holy See considers it necessary to reinforce the unaltered 
worth of the catholic teaching about the marriage and the 
encouragement of the Church for the dignity and the worth of the 
family, the basis of the society.”  
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Malta  1993/4 No. 2. “The Church shall enlighten prospective spouses about the specific 
nature of canonical marriage and, […]” 
 
Poland  1993/11, 
Slovakia  2000/11 
“The Contracting Parties manifest they will cooperate for defence 
and to respect the institution of the marriage and the family, basis 
of the society.” 
 
A.2.4.2. The provision of legal force for the decisions of the ecclesiastical forum 
 
A.2.4.2.1.  By delimitation of the jurisdictional competences 
 
1. Compels the contracting Parties:  
 
Colombia  1942/9, 
Colombia  1973 Add.  
Prot. 8. 
The cases of nullity, of dispensation from marriages rato et non 
consummato, of the procedure of privilegium paulinum are in the 
exclusive competence of the ecclesiastical courts and congregations.” 
Spain  1953/24 The same and the cases of separation as well. 
Italy  1929/34, 
Portugal  1940/25, 
Dominica  1954/16 No. 1., 
Colombia  1973/8 
“As it concerns the cases of the nullity of the marriages and the 
dispensation from marriages rato et non consummato are reserved 
for ecclesiastical courts and congregations.” 
Austria  1933/7 § 3., 
 
 
Austria  1933 Add. Prot. 7. 
No. 1. 
“The Republic of Austria recognises the competence of ecclesiasti-
cal courts and congregations in case of the nullity of the marriages 
and the dispensation from marriages rato et non consummato.”  
“The Republic of Austria recognises the competence of the 
ecclesiastical Authorities in case of the procedure of privilegium 
paulinum as well.” 
Malta  1993/4 No. 2. “[… specific nature of canonical marriage] and, consequently, 
about ecclesiastical jurisdiction concerning the marriage bond.” 
 
Poland  1993/10 No. 3., 
 
 
No. 4. 
“It is in the exclusive competence of the ecclesiastical authority to 
judge upon the validity of canonical marriage, and upon the other 
matrimonial cases issued in canon law.”  
“To judge upon matrimonial cases concerning the legal effects 
provided in the polish laws is in the exclusive competence of the 
statal coursts.” 
 
2. Compels the parties:  
 
Spain I.  1979/6 No. 2. “Concordant with the provisions of the canon law the parties can 
appeal to ecclesiastical courts for the declaration of the nullity or 
ask for the pontifical dispensation from marriages ratum et non 
consummatum.”  
Malta  1993/4 No. 2. “[… the ecclesiastical jurisdiction concerning the bond of 
marriage.] The prospective spouses shall, by way of acceptance, 
formally take note of this in writing.” 
64 MIKLÓS RÓNAY 
  
Dominica  1954/15  
No. 2. 
“[…] by the mere fact of celebrating a canonical marriage the spouses 
renounce the secular faculty of asking for divorce, which therefore 
will not be  applicable for canonical marriage by civil courts.”  
 
A.2.4.2.2.  Providing secular legal force for the decisions 
 
Malta  1993/3 “The Republic of Malta recognizes for all civil effects, in terms of 
this Agreement, the judgements of nullity and the decrees of 
ratification of nullity of marriage given by the ecclesiastical 
tribunals and which have become executive.”  
Malta  1993/7 “The decrees of the Roman Pontiff super matrimonium ratum et non 
consummatum are recognized, as regards civil effects by the 
Republic of Malta, upon request, accompanied by the authentic copy 
of the pontifical decree, presented to the Court of Appeal by the parties 
or by either of them.” 
 
Croatia  1996/13 “The decisions of ecclesiastical Courts upon nullity of marriage 
and those of the Supreme Authority of the Church upon dispense 
from matrimonial bond are communicated to the competent civil 
Court to put into effect the civil consequences of the measurement, 
according to the legal norms of the Republic of Croatia.”  
 
Slovakia  2000/10 No. 2. “The decisions of the Catholic Church upon nullity of marriage 
and upon dispense from matrimonial bond are communicated to the 
request of one of the interested parties to the Republic of Slovakia. 
The Republic of Slovakia will proceed according to its juridical 
order.” 
 
Lithuania  2000/13 No. 4. 
 
“Decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals on the nullity of marriage and 
decrees of the Supreme Authority of the Church on the dissolution of 
the marriage bond are to be reported to the competent authorities 
of the Republic of Lithuania with the aim of regulating legal 
consequences of such decisions in accordance with the legal acts of 
the Republic of Lithuania.” 
 
A.2.4.3. Attribution of the secular legal effects  
 
Austria 1933/7. § 4., 
Italy  1929/34, 
Colombia  1942/9, 
Spain  1953/24 No. 4. 
“The provisions and the judgements when they are definitive are 
brought to the Supreme Court of the Secretariat which controls if 
the rules of the canon law were observed relating to the judge’s 
competence and the summoning and of the representation or 
keeping away of the parties. The declared provisions and definitive 
judgements with the relative decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
Apostolic Secretariat are handed over to the Supreme Court of 
Austria. The civil effects come into force by decision of the 
execution made in secret meeting of the Supreme Court of Austria.”  
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Portugal  1940/25, 
Dominica  1954/16 No. 2. 
The same but the handing over is through a diplomatic way. 
Spain  1953/24 No. 3., 
Colombia  1973/8. 
The same, but leaving out the Secretariat, the ecclesiastical court 
communicates the judgement to the secular court. 
 
Spain  1953/24 No. 2. “[...] is the civil Court’s task is to decide at the interested person’s 
request about the norms and the precautionary measures regulating 
the civil effects of the case under way.”  
 
Spain I.  1979/6 No. 2. “At request of anybody of the parties the said ecclesiastical 
provisions will have effects in the civil legal order if they are 
declared conform with the State law by a resolution issued by 
the competent civil court.”  
Italy  1984/8 No. 2. The same bat the court of appeal decides in judgement with 
conditions:  
“– whether the judge were competent in the case, if the celebration 
took place on the basis of the Agreement, 
– whether in proceedings of the ecclesiastical court the right to act 
and to defend were provided in a way not different from the basic 
principles of the Italian legal order, 
– whether they correspond to the other conditions prescribed in the 
Italian law for the proclamation of effects of foreign judgements.  
The court of appeal can make interim economical measurements, 
in the judgement with which it implements the canonical 
judgement, to the advantage of one of the parties whom marriage 
has been declare null, sending them to the competent judge to 
decide in the matter.”  
Malta  1993/5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“[The judgements … are recognized …] provided that: 
a) a request is presented, by the parties or either of them, to the Court 
of Appeal together with an authentic copy of the judgement or 
decree, as well as a declaration of its execution according to canon 
law issued by the tribunal that has given the executive decision; 
b) the Court of Appeal ascertains that: 
I. the ecclesiastical tribunal was competent to judge the case of 
nullity of the marriage insofar as the marriage was celebrated 
according to the canonical form of the Catholic Church or with a 
dispensation from it; 
II. during the canonical juridical proceedings the right of action 
and defence was assured to the parties, in a manner substantially 
not dissimilar to the principles of the Constitution of Malta; 
III. in the case of a marriage celebrated in Malta after the 11 
August 1975 the act of marriage laid down by the civil law has 
been delivered or transmitted to the Public Registry; 
IV. no contrary judgement pronounced by the civil tribunals and 
which has become res judicata, based on the same grounds of 
nullity.” 
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Malta  1993/8. “In the exercise of its specific functions as regards to the 
recognition of the decrees mentioned in article 7, as well as of the 
judgements of nullity or of the decrees of ratification of nullity of 
marriage mentioned in Article 3, the Court of Appeal does not re-
examine the merits of the case.” 
 
